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Extension and Feasibility 
of the Woods Report 
to the Developing Countries 
Syed M. A. Hameed 
This paper attempts to evaluate the adequacy of the 
theoretical model used in the Woods Task Force Report, 
explores the possibility of Us extension to the analysis of 
the comparative industrial relations Systems and examines 
the feasibility of exporting certain éléments of the Canadian 
industrial relations system to the developing countries. 
The pace of industrial development around the world, during the 
past three décades, has not produced comparable change in the industrial 
relations Systems. Consequently, in the midst of strikes and growing 
dissatisfaction with the collective bargaining process, affected countries 
are planning to introduce reform measures. In Britain, Edward Heath's 
conservative government intends to put before the Parliament, such 
measures as a 60-day cooling off period in essential industries, make 
collective bargaining provisions legally binding on the parties, outlaw 
closed shop arrangements, and prescribe penalties against unions which 
defy court orders. Another industrial country, New Zealand, has been 
wracked by serious strikes and the government has been accused of 
failing to bring industrial relations system in line with the âge of techno-
logy. Somewhat similar circumstance in Canada, led to the establishment 
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The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the feasibility of the Woods 
Report to the developing countries, in a conceptual and normative frame-
work. In other words, it will attempt to : (1) evaluate the adequacy of 
the theoretical model used in the Woods Task Force report ; (2) explore 
the possibility of its extension to the analysis of the comparative industrial 
relations Systems ; and (3) examine the feasibility of exporting certain 
éléments of the Canadian industrial relations System to the developing 
countries *. 
Adequacy of the Theoretical Model of the Woods Task Force 
There seems to be a close parallel between the state of économie 
development théories and the model used by the Woods Report. For ins-
tance, the explanation of économie growth is somewhat obfuscated by the 
multiplicity of explanatory variables used in the development théories. By 
emphasizing one or two variables as key initiators of the growth process, 
individual theorists lent simplicity and operationalism but sacrificed the 
prospects of a gênerai theory. For instance, Hittington emphasized natural 
resources ; Schumpeter, innovating entrepreneurs ; Thorstein Veblen, vir-
tue of a disciplined and enterprising people ; Nurkse, Harrod and Domar, 
Capital formation ; Hagen, social capacity ; Milton Friedman and Kind-
leberger, free market system 2. 
1
 Various aspects of the Task Force Report and related research hâve received 
criticism and praise in récent rnonths. Relations Industrielles published selected 
articles in 1970, (Vol. 25, no 1). One of them commented that « Little note in taken 
in the Report of the outeome of the state of comparative literature on industrial 
relations Systems of the world which appeared in the fifties ». (See J.T. MONTAGUE, 
«The Task Force Report»). I intend to deal with this question from a theoretical 
and a normative angle in this paper. 
2
 See Howard S. ELLIS, «Accelerated Investment as a Force in Economie 
Development », The Quarterly Journal of Economies, Vol, LXXII, Novernber 1958, 
No. 4, p. 485. For gênerai theoretical development see also Adolph LOWE, « Struc-
tural Analysis of Real Capital Formation » and W. W. ROSTOW, « Some General 
Reflexions on Capital Formation and Economie Growth» in Conférence of the 
Universities - National Bureau Committee for Economie Research, Capital Forma-
tion and Economie Growth (Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1955), 
pp. 581-667 ; Mosses ABRAMOVITZ, «Economies of Growth», in A Survey of Con-
temporary Economies (Homewood, III. : Richard D. IRWIN, 1952) ; and B. S. KEIN-
STEAD, The Theory of Economie Change (Toronto : Macmillan Company of Canada, 
1948). 
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A summation of ail thèse factors under the rubric of a simple con-
ceptual framework may produce a unified theory of économie develop-
ment, but it is highly improbable if it will remain operational and veri-
fiable. 
For examining and explaining the internai workings of the Canadian 
industrial relations system, the Task Force on Labour Relations, used a 
theoretical model which duplicated the problem outlined above. It em-
ployed six environmental factors as explanatory variables. In essence, they 
encompass ail those factors which economists, from Schumpeter to 
Friedman, emphasized in their explanation of the process of économie 
growth. Such an approach has the merits of a unified theory but also 
the encumberances of obscurity and non-operationalism. 
Through an inter-dependency model where the lines of causality 
in a schematic présentation flow in either direction, the Task Force 
attempts to explain the interaction among the affected parties, the me-
chanisms and results of interaction. There are at least three inadequacies 
in this approach : (1) The environmental factors (ecological, économie, 
social, cultural, political, constitutional, and légal Systems) virtually include 
everything under the sun that might affect the industrial relations system. 
It approximates the requirements of a gênerai theory but in the process 
becomes a non-theory ; in attempting to explain everything, it explains 
nothing specifically. For example, every time there is a work stoppage, it 
could be blamed on ail the six environmental factors, eight affected parties 
and the interaction processes. How has the theory helped us ? The expla-
natory factors are so numerous and diffused that nothing can be said 
with any degree of confidence about the causes of the occurrence of a 
strike or its future incidence. This is not to suggest that the conceptual 
constructs used by the Task Force do not constitute a theory. It simply 
indicates that the scientific potency of this theory is very low because the 
range of facts that need to be fed into it is much larger than what it 
actually explains. In other words, fewer and operational variables increase 
the potency and quality of a theory by increasing its explanatory power. 
If, for instance, priées were to be explained not simply through quantity 
of money, its velocity and volume of transactions, but a host of additional 
factors, the theory will become more defensible but less potent. Similarly, 
if the process of économie growth were to be explained exclusively in 
terms of capital formation, wages in terms of the marginal productivity 
of labour, consumer and management behavior in terms of profit and 
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utility maximization, respectively, rather than a number of additional 
variables, we would certainly hâve broad based théories and they would 
considerably reduce our understanding of the causal phenomenon and 
consequently our ability to take précautions and apply remédiai measures. 
A scientific enterprise must be a quest for genuine invariants, fewer in 
number, to explain a wide range of industrial relations characteristics and 
their présent and probabalistic changes, such as the incidence of strikes, 
collective agreement provisions and labour standards. On the contrary, 
the Task Force model seems to employ innumerable and unspecified va-
riables which are implicit in the six environmental Systems. 
(2) The Task Force Report does not define a system ; John T. 
Dunlop in his book Industrial Relations Systems defines it in a Parsonian 
tradition3, as an interaction between two or more actors, but does not 
include ecology as a system. The dictionary meaning of the word ecology 
is « the science of the relationships between organisms and their environ-
ments ». How important or significant an addition is it to the Dunlopian 
environmental scheme ? I feel it is not ; it merely constitutes another 
example of the multiplicity of the exploratory variables. The Report has 
dismissed it cursority, summarizing it in two paragraphs which discuss it 
under political, économie and social environment. Rightfully, that: is what 
it is : part of the économie production constraint. « The climate, physical 
proportions and natural resources » 4, are clearly part of the économie 
system but to give them an indépendant conceptual standing tends to 
obscure the model. 
(3) The framework is considered « dynamic » as it purports to 
examine the influence of the environmental factors on the concerned par-
ties, their interaction and the results which ultimately feed back into the 
system. I feel that two very significant dimensions of this process are 
missing which render the model less dynamic. 
3
 PARSONS and SMELSER define a social system as « . . . the system generated by 
any process of interaction, on the socio-cultural level, between two or more actors. 
The actor is either a concrète human individual (a person) or a collectivity of which 
a plurality of persons are members>. See Talcott PARSONS and Neil J. SMELSER, 
Economy and Society, A Study in the Intégration of Economy and Social Theory, 
(London : Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1956). 
4 Canadian Industrial Relations, The Report of the Task Force on Labour Rela-
tions, the Queen's Printer, 1969, p. 14. 
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a) Institutional compatibility : The model per se and its application 
throughout the Woods' report are silent on the nature and implications of 
the interaction among the environmental Systems. For example, there is 
no conceptual or empirical statement concerning the effects of technolo-
gical change on the social, cultural, or légal System, or vice versa. It is 
conceivable or perhaps also a common observance that ail the environ-
mental Systems may develop simultaneously or harmoniously. Whenever 
a new social or économie phenomenon émerges as a disruptive force, 
légal, political, or even constitutional Systems endeavour to incorporate 
adjustive provisions to cope with the situation. If technological change 
renders workers unemployed or the increasing use of drug affects the 
behavior of youth adversely, there would ensue a public debate for cor-
rective législative measures. On the contrary, if new laws are placed on 
the statute books, some corrective, individual and institutional behavior 
may follow 5. In short, a considérable degree of institutional compatibility 
may be expected but to assume it as ceteris paribus is to mitigate realism 
as well as dynamism in the model. 
b) Institutional lag : Although institutional compatibility may be 
regarded as a generic social phenomenon, its spécifie exceptions are too 
significant to be ignored. A certain environmental System in the Task 
Force schematic présentation may lag behind others, perhaps as a resuit 
of inadéquate inter-system borrowing, sagging social innovation at home 
or a high tariff barrier' against the import of fresh ideas from abroad. 
This could cause a major disruption in the institutional environment with 
its implications for the industrial relations System. A dynamic analysis of 
what happens in an industrial relations system must take cognizance of 
the institutional lag phenomenon. This is a significant point, formulating 
the crux of an argument that it is not so much the présence of an insti-
tutional environment which matters for a dynamic analysis as it is a 
'disequilibrium' or a lag which affects the interaction process and its 
results. In fact, it could become a potent tool of analysis in a model for 
comparative industrial relations. 
5 This statement purports to emphasize the innovative rôle of the law. In other 
words, légal system does not always assume a corrective fonction, intending to remedy 
the institutional lag, but in many cases it may create a new légal environment, forcing 
other Systems to achieve a comparable level of institutional compatibility. 
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Extension of the Task Force Model 
The multiplicity of the exploratory factors and the non-recognition 
of the institutional lag phenomenon are the two most significant factors 
which reduce the effectivences of the Task Force model, both for the 
analysis of the Canadian system and its extension of international indus-
trial relations Systems. However, as pointed out earlier, the first élément 
may be considered a positive attribute as it makes the model more defen-
sible or less vulnérable to criticism. 
Despite a fair degree of mental trépidation, I am verturing to propose 
a modification of the Task Force model to suggest a change in its emphasis 
rather than in the fundamental postulâtes. 
INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
The concept of using an environment, comprising of a number of 
Systems, is a useful launching pad. Each system comprises of individuals 
and groups who interact among themselves for the attainment of spécifie 
goals. Depending upon the nature of goal orientation, structure of values, 
achievement motivation, etc., a system will establish its scale and pattern 
of growth. 
INTER-SYSTEM BORROWING 
Participants in thèse Systems may be identified by various dénomi-
nations such as consumers, producers, employers, employées, voters, le-
gislators, judges, clergy and others. Thèse individuals may interact within 
and accross the boundaries of the Systems and, in fact, the same individuals 
may play différent rôles in différent Systems. This process ensures an 
inter-system borrowing of ideas and resources which produce, to an extent, 
circumstances for an equalization of the growth process. 
ALTERNATIVE MEASURES 
If the Systems cannot achieve an equilibrium through an inter-system 
borrowing, there are two alternatives : 
— Borrowing of ideas and resources (technical knowhow, capital, 
législative provisions, immigrants, etc.) from abroad ; and, 
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— Government intervention measures with an aim to reallocate 
resources to restore institutional compatibility. 
Further analysis of thèse points is important in extending the Task Force 
model for comparing the international industrial relations Systems. 
Borrowing from Abroad 
Historically, Canada, like most countries in the world, has developed 
its institutions through international borrowing and indigenous social in-
novations. Her économie, légal, political, social and constitutional Sys-
tems reflect such borrowings in large measure. The industrial relations 
System is no exception. The development of législation on labour-manage-
ment relations at the fédéral level (and in a majority of provinces) reflects 
foreign législative influences in each enactment and order-in-council since 
the very first law in 1872. Trade Union and Criminal Law Amendments 
Act (1872) was patterned after the British Trade Unions Act (1871) ; 
Conciliation Act (1900) borrowed from the United Kingdom Conciliation 
Act (1896) ; the Industrial Dispute Investigation Act (1907) combined 
législative provisions from the British and American laws ; and the In-
dustrial Relations and Dispute Investigation Act (1948) was influenced 
by the American Wagner Act (1935). However, in their analysis of the 
contemporary industrial relations System, the Task Force conveys an im-
pression that there is nothing worth borrowing from abroad ; they would 
much rather rely on indigenous innovation which forms the crux of their 
recommendations. Neither their schematic présentation nor the contem-
porary analysis of the Canadian institutions explains why borrowing from 
abroad has become inappropriate when the entire history of législation on 
labour-management relations has depended on foreign borrowing. How-
ever, within the modified framework developed in this paper, it is possible 
(though not defensible) to explain the logical consistency in this décision. 
First, the rash of strikes and growing public mistrust of the collective 
bargaining process in Canada in récent years is symptomatic of an insti-
tutional lag where industrial relations System has failed to keep pace with 
the development in other Systems. Hence, the establishment of the Task 
Force on Labour Relations. Secondly, an inter-system borrowing, over 
the years to establish an institutional compatibility, has not taken place 
due to some obstructions in the 'osmosis' process. The Task Force has 
not investigated the causes of breakdown in a process which 'ought to be' 
autonomous and self-adjusting. Thirdly, to restore balance or compatibi-
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lity, législative ideas can be borrowed from abroad or indigenous techni-
ques may be developed. The Task Force has relied on the latter which 
consists of a large array of recommendations, including a change in the 
government intervention policy 6. 
Government Intervention Policy 
In the dynamic process of institutional growth and change, there 
might develop an inter-system conflict of goals and values. For instance, 
économie goals of price stability may be thwarted by inflationary wage 
settlements, or démocratie values of freedom, particularly freedom to 
strike in essential indusdries, may cause excessive inconvenience to the 
public. There might also develop a power imbalance among the actors of 
compteing Systems. Some of thèse are inhérent institutional problems but 
others are indicative of an institutional lag. In the latter case, somewhat 
reluctantly, the government intervenes through administrative, judicial or 
législative measures. The degree of reluctance or the mode of intervention 
in labour disputes détermines the process and outeome of labour, mana-
gement and public interaction. For instance, in the Canadian industrial 
relations System, government intervention takes three différent forms : 
(1) At the time of certification, it imposes a démocratie solution and 
recognizes a bargaining agent on the majority principale. (2) At the 
time of negotiations, the solution is not compulsory but a séries of pro-
cédural steps such as a postponement of strike or lock-out during com-
pulsory conciliation, a no-strike period following termination of concilia-
tion and a strike vote must be observed. (3) During a prolonged strike 
or a strike in « essential » industries, the government may invoke emer-
gency dispute seulement measures. Thèse intervention measures are unique 
to the Canadian system and indeed, by reflecting the libéral démocratie 
philosophy and the values of free enterprise economy, make it what it is. 
The last intervention measure is particularly sensitive to any change in 
thèse basic values of the Canadian society. Intervention measures of this 
kind, due to their sensitivity to the fundamental value structure in a given 
society, may, therefore, quite logically, serve as comparative criteria in 
international labour relations. 
Technology and bureaucracy are, no doubt, useful criteria for com-
paring économie and social Systems around the world. Industrial relations 
6 There is évidence in the Task Force Report that foreign expérience has helped 
the members in their délibérations. For example, see pages 127, 189 and 191. 
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experts hâve also generally relied on the same set of criteria to compare 
industrial relations Systems in différent countries 7 The level of technolo-
gical development, in conjunction with the other environmental Systems 
(social, political and légal), is considered a significant and differentiating 
parameter in determining the relationship among labour, management and 
government. 
Without denying the validity of thèse criteria, the government inter-
vention policies deserve centrality for two reasons : (1) Theoretically, 
they can serve as a viable index of the labour maturity, management 
development and fondamental social, économie and political values in 
the society. (2) Their variations characterize and to a large extent déter-
mine the nature of labour, management and public interaction, with over-
whelming policy implications. 
Exportability of Certain Eléments of the Canadîan IR System 
Government intervention in labour disputes may take various forms, 
such as conciliation, médiation, non-binding arbitration, voluntary binding 
arbitration, compulsory arbitration, fact-finding, and ad hoc procédures. 
In a given industrial relations system, it is the prevalence of one or the 
other form of intervention which broadly détermines its characteristics. 
Canada's compulsory conciliation, Australia's compulsory arbitration and 
Pakistan's tri-partite industrial courts, for instance, distinguish thèse Sys-
tems from one another on the basis of the mode of governmental inter-
vention. By comparison, technology and bureaucracy are relatively less 
effective criteria in comparative industrial relations Systems. 
Given such différences among various industrial relations Systems, 
especially between the developed and the developing countries, can any 
of the Task Force recommendations be feasible for other Systems ? To 
explore this question, two of my research associâtes and I did an extensive 
survey of various reports commissioned by the Task Force8. We also 
7 Kerr et al. hâve used industrializing élites and their stratégies in the process 
of technological development as comparative criteria in the shaping of the industrial 
relations Systems. 
8 We are particularly grateful to William A. WESTLEY, Gordon W. BERTRAM, 
H. W. ARTHURS, Gérard DION, E. F. BEACH, G. E. EATON, J. T. MONTAGUE, Stuart 
JAMIESON, Pierre VERGE, Félix QUINET, Ruby SAMLALSINGH, Jack CHERNICLE for 
responding to our enquiry and giving us the benefit of their valuable opinion. 
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corresponded with the authors of a number of thèse reports to assess the 
feasibility and relevance of their research for developing countries. The 
findings of our survey and the responses we received were broadly in 
agreement, although with notable exceptions. They may be summarized as 
follows : 
Social anthropologists and industrial relations experts hâve long 
recognized the uniqueness of institutional development in différent coun-
tries of the world. They stress the difficultés in attempting to export parts 
of one system to another. 
Without denying the validity of such assertions, Charles A. Myers 
has developed a very convincing case in favour of exporting « some 
éléments » of the American industrial relations system. 9 We tend to agrée 
with this position rather than the one suggested by some of our respondents 
who strongly feel that nothing can be exported from the Canadien indus-
trial relations system. An important différence between Professor Myers 
and our position is that we add government intervention policy to his 
list of exportable éléments which include human relations and personnal 
practices of the American management, union leadership development 
programs, social security system and techniques of coUecting labour and 
manpower statistics. The reasons for doing so are explicit in our proposed 
modification of the conceptual framework used by the Task Force. Fur-
thermore, this departure seems to be reinforced in a limited sensé as 
Professor Woods, discussing the Canadian policy experiments with public-
interest disputes, has hinted at the possibility of learning from the U.S. 
government's intervention policies.10 
We feel that ideas for re-structuring of institutions, like industriali-
zation and technical know-how, spread to the developing countries through 
9 Charles A. MYERS, « The American System of Industrial Relations : Is it 
Exportable ? » IRRA proceedings, 1962. Also, according to Justice Nathan T. NE-
METZ, «The Swedish system of labour law and practice cannot be appïied in its 
entirety to Canadian conditions, but this does not mean that we cannot profit by 
Sweden's expérience ». See Labour Gazette, July, 1968. 
!0 I hope I am not reading too much into Professor Woods concluding remarks 
when he writes : « As our ex-President, Charles MYERS, has told us, there is much 
in industrial relations Systems that is not exportable. Nevertheless, our two économies 
and our system of industrial relations are sufficiently similar and even interlocked 
to an extent that makes comparison useful ». See H. D. WOODS, « Canadian Policy 
Experiments with Public-Interest Disputes», IRRA, Spring Meeting Proceedings, 
May 1963. 
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diffusion rather than independent social innovation and indigenous 
research. Historically, expansion of markets and colonialism were the 
means of diffusion. Contemporaneously, mass média and international 
agencies (such as the ILO, FAO, UNESCO and the others) perform part 
of this function. 
The Task Force undertook 73 studies on various aspects of Canadian 
industrial relations. We could obtain only 28 studies for our survey ; the 
remainder, at various stages of processing and printing, were not available. 
For our purpose this survey was much wider than what we needed to 
undertake, although there were two other studies which were quite 
relevant yet unavailable. n Using Professor Myers criterion of exportability 
we only needed to concentrate on management studies but unfortunately 
the Task Force commissioned only two studies in this area. The labour 
movement studies and studies of collective bargaining process and results 
as well as a large number of spécial studies on individual industries, being 
highly involved with the unique Canadian problems, contained virtually 
no éléments of exportability. Consequently, in line with our conceptual 
emphasis on governement intervention policies, we narrowed our focus to 
only four studies 12 and certain selected Task Force recommendations, 
such as the proposed establisment of the Public Interest Disputes Com-
mission (PIDC). 
An International Comparison 
A large number of developing countries in South Asia, Southeast 
Asia and Latin America hâve already entered the Rostowian take-off 
stage.13 But their non-economic institutions and their value structure as 
it relates to government intervention policy in labour relations, are lagging 
behind their growth in économie System. Unions are still suppressed ; the 
incidence of collective bargaining is fairly limited and the right to strike 
dones not exist in a large number of « essential industries ». The positive 
rôle of unionism, collective bargaining and strikes in institutionalizing 
protest and ventilating pent-up frustration of the growing industrial work 
H LORENTSEN, Edith, Public Policy and Labour Législation -An Historical 
Review and BROWN, Donald J.M., Compulsory Arbitration. 
12 (1) ARTHURS, Harry W., Essential lndustry Disputes Seulement Techniques. 
(2) DION, Gérard, Statutory Strikes and «The Statutory Strike Formula», Relations 
Industrielles, April, 1969. (3) ISAAC, LE., Compulsory Arbitration in Australia. (4) 
MALLES, P., Trends in Industrial Relations Systems of Continental Europe. 
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force is ignored. The sélection of dispute settlement techniques in thèse 
countries is biased toward maximizing industrial peace which tends to 
reduce individual and group freedom. Having attained a saving of ap-
proximately ten per cent of the GNP, thèse countries need to develop 
compatible institutions and value structure. As the basic human needs of 
food and shelter are satisfied, needs of higher order, such as, individual 
liberties, protection of property and self-respect seek their satisfaction. If 
such needs are devised, individual and group frustration finds its expression 
in varying degrees of political protest and violence. Part of the reason for 
political instability in the developing countries may be attributed to this 
factor. 
The suppression of unions and harsher government intervention 
measures, in our conceptual scheme, represent an institutional lag in the 
developing countries. Unions, after a certain level of économie growth, 
become an asset in developing a committed work force. They help the 
management in their recruitment, training and discipline programs. On a 
national se aie, they become a training ground for administrators and 
political leaders. They often become the champions of socio-economic 
change by drawing public attention to the need for land reform, social 
législation and équitable taxation system. 
How can this institutional lag be corrected ? A certain degree of cor-
rection, as pointed out earlier, is inhérent in the process of inter-system 
borrowing. The developing nations may continue to neglect a conscious 
development of the industrial relations system but given sufficiently long 
span of time, changes in the économie system may bring about a change 
in their value structure and a conséquent change in their governmental 
intervention policies or dispute settlement techniques. According to Harry 
Arthurs, the relative significance of the following social objectives or 
values, détermine the use of dispute settlement techniques.14 
13
 It stands to reason that unions up to and including the take-off stage may 
be controlled or even suppressed, in the interest of économie growth. But subse-
quently, basic needs of food and shelter having been satisfied, needs of higher order, 
including the need for freedom of association and strike, must be restored. See W.W. 
ROSTON, The Stages of Economie Growth, (Cambridge : The Cambridge University 
Press, 1967) and Paul FISHER, «The Economie Rôle of Unions in Less-Developed 
Areas», IRRA Spring Proceedings 1961. Everett M. KASSALOW, «Labor in Develop-
ment : A Critique of Some Current Concepts », IRRA Annual Proceedings 1969. 
14 Harry W. ARTHURS, op. cit. 
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a) freedom of économie action 
b) industrial peace 
c) protection of life, health, safety and national security 
d) protection of the quality of community life 
e) minimizing économie losses for non-combatants ; and 
f) rational allocation of se are social resources. 
Whether a government intervenes in a given strike, promptly or after 
a certain period of time, dépends upon an interplay of the above values 
and the meaning they lend to such crucial concepts as « protection of 
individual or group freedom » and « essential industries ».15 In Canada, 
for instance, the freedom of unions to strike is denied in such essential 
services as firemen and policemen. Government intervention is very active 
in other areas including éducation and transportation. On the other hand, 
« there are few forms of collective économie action which per se are for-
bidden under Swedish law and agreement » 16. Yet another interesting 
case is found in the Australian légal structure where paradoxically, the 
law prohibits the use of strike but there is a high incidence of illégal strikes 
which are not effectively penalized by the courts.17 Perhaps one of the 
extrême cases on the far corner of this continuum is that of Pakistan which 
repealed the Industrial Disputes Act (1947) in 1958 and decreed a harsher 
government intervention policy through the Industrial Disputes Ordinance 
(1959). The new ordinance replaced the ad hoc compulsory arbitration 
tribunals with permanent tripartite industrial courts. The chairmen of 
thèse courts are appointed by the government. They are not bound by the 
advice of the labour and management représentatives on the bench and 
hâve only an advisory status. Awards of thèse courts remain in force for 
one year and may be renewed for another two years. The courts hâve 
jurisdiction over both interest and right disputes and may also change the 
terms of contract. This is a clear case of institutional lag as Pakistan 
attained the take-off stage during its Second Five Year Plan (1960-65), 
investing upto 17 per cent of GNP which resulted in accelerated growth 
of close to 6 per cent per annum. But the severity of government inter-
vention measures in the industrial relations System continues. 
15 S. HAMEED, A. Theory of Strike Cost and Government Intervention Policy, 
(Mimeographed). 
16 p. MALLES, op. cit. 
n Ibid, pp. 17 and 23. 
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What is common to ail thèse countries is a désire to eliminate or 
minimize industrial conflicts. In Canada, public interest disputes in parti-
cular and others in gênerai are considered undesirable because of the 
économie and social costs of work stoppage. But at the same time, the 
institution of free collective bargaining embedded in the values of political 
democracy and welfare capitalism, is very well protected. A délicate trade-
off between the social and économie costs on the one hand and politico-
économie right to strike, on the other, influences government intervention 
policies. In other words, Canada, Australia and Sweden hâve différent 
shades of political democracy and welfare capitalism as well as some 
variation in the social and économie costs associated with work stoppage 
in their respective countries. Accordingly, légal improvisation, mixed with 
occasional ingenuity, has provided différent assortment of dispute seule-
ment techniques in thèse countries. Similarly, Pakistan with no entrenched 
démocratie values, predominantly state-initiated system of production and 
fréquent politically motivated strikes, issued the Industrial Disputes Ordi-
nance (1959) which drastically reduced industrial disputes through strict 
gouvernement intervention measures contained in this Ordinance. Thus, it 
becomes évident that a high degree of corrélation exists between value 
structure and government intervention policies. But values do not change 
as readily as changes in the économie system. On the other hand, condi-
tions of économie growth require changes in the techniques of dispute 
settlement. If thèse techniques are judiciously selected to avoid a direct 
clash with the indigenous values when imported will help solve the problem 
of institutional lag to the great benefit of the society concerned. I feel that 
the statutory strike formula 18 and the Public Interest Dispute Commis-
sion 19 are the kind of social innovations which may be safely experi-
mented with in the developing countries, particularly in Pakistan. 
Conclusion 
It appears that industrial relations Systems around the world, in 
gênerai, and in the developing countries, in particular, hâve lagged behind 
the post World War II development in the économie Systems of thèse 
countries. With the diffusion of technological processes, foreign aid and 
investment in the developing countries, the need for simultaneously bor-
rowing législative ideas is becoming increasingly great. If the government 
18 Gérard DION, op. cit. 
!9 The Task Force on Labour Relations, op. cit. 
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intervention policies and dispute settlement techniques are allowed to 
change only as a resuit of technological borrowing (see chart above) the 
time gap, on account of the intervening variables, would be enormous. 
Consequently, the industrial relations System will be perpetually lagging 
behind the économie System 20. Consider, for instance, the following fac-
tors in the context of developing countries : (1) Government responsi-
bility in matters of économie development ; (2) Récognition and concern 
to protect public or consumer interest, especially during extended labour 
dispute ; (3) Freedom of the workers to strike. The first factor is very 
strongly accepted as it is a direct concomitant of the technological borrow-
ing process. Likewise, there is no difficulty in endorsing the second factor 
as it is complementary to the goals of économie development. The diffi-
culty arises in attempting to implement the third factor which threatens 
to erode the first two. 
The resolution of this dilemna is possible along thèse lines : ( 1 ) Bor-
rowing législative ideas from the Western countries which hâve had long 
expérience with the freedom of workers to strike. (2) Making a clear 
distinction between public-interest disputes and the disputes where public 
interest is not jeopardized. (3) Pérmitting optimum government interven-
tion and the use of innovative techniques such as a statutory strike formula 
or the establishment of a Public Interest Disputes Commission in the for-
20 i am aware of the fact that technical aid program, both from the Western 
countries and the Soviet Bloc, hâve « strings > attached to them. This implies an 
acceptance and some implementation of political, administrative or militaristic 
measures which are favorable or antithetical to the démocratie and capitalistic values 
and philosophy. This tends to change the value structure while technology makes its 
inroads in the économie System. 
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mer cases and little or not intervention in the latter ones. Quite under-
standably, the list of industries in the public-interest dispute category will 
be exceedingly long in the developing countries and may include public 
utilities such as railways and other means of transportation, water and 
power works, communications, food supplies, police and firemen and 
even banking, munitions and primary export industries. Ostensibly, such 
an approach is far from being revolutionary in its magnitude or immédiate 
effects. But a formai récognition of the right of works to strike in limited 
segments of the economy will hâve far reaching effects in democratizing 
the society at large in line with the developments in the économie System. 
LE RAPPORT WOODS ET LES PAYS 
EN VOIE DE DÉVELOPPEMENT 
Subventionné par le Conseil des Arts du Canada, nous avons entrepris un examen 
détaillé des différents rapports soumis à l'Équipe spécialisée en relations du travail. À 
cette occasion, nous avons contacté plusieurs des auteurs de ces études afin de voir 
dans quelle mesure les résultats obtenus pouvaient s'appliquer au cas des pays en 
voie de développement. 
L'Équipe spécialisée a entrepris 73 recherches sur différents aspects des relations 
industrielles au Canada. Nous n'avons pu en obtenir que 28 pour notre propre 
recherche, les autres n'étant pas encore disponibles au moment de notre étude. Ce-
pendant, ceci était amplement suffisant pour répondre au but que nous nous étions 
fixé, même s'il y avait deux études pertinentes celles de Lorenstein et de Brown, que 
nous n'avons pas pu obtenir. En utilisant le critère « d'exportabilite » développé par 
le professeur Mayers, nous n'avions alors qu'à concentrer notre attention sur les 
études portant sur le côté patronal. Cependant l'Équipe spécialisé ne commanda que 
deux recherches en ce domaine. Plusieurs études, pertinentes seulement pour le 
Canada, ne contenaient aucun élément « d'exportabilite ». Citons les cas des recher-
ches sur le mouvement syndical canadien, sur le processus de la négociation collec-
tive et le grand nombre d'études de cas réalisées partout sur de nombreuses industries 
canadiennes. Conséquemment, notre cadre conceptuel nous a donné à retenir seule-
ment 4 études (celles de Arthurs, Dion, Isaac et Malles) et certaines recommanda-
tion de l'Équipe spécialisée telles celles qui proposent l'établissement de la Commis-
sion des conflits d'intérêts dans le secteur public. 
UNE COMPARAISON INTERNATIONALE 
Plusieurs pays en voie de développement en Asie du Sud, en Asie du Sud-Est 
et en Amérique Latine sont parvenus au stage du départ tel que défini par Rostow. 
Mais leurs institutions non-économiques et leurs systèmes de valeur quant à l'inter-
vention gouvernementale en matière de relations de travail accuse un certain retard 
sur la croissance du système économique. Les syndicats sont encore prohibés ; la 
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négociation collective a un impact relativement limité et le droit de grève est prohibé 
dans un grand nombre d'industries dites essentielles. On ignore le rôle positif du 
syndicalisme, de la négociation collective et des grèves. Dans le choix des techniques 
de règlement des conflits dans ces pays, on cherche systématiquement à maximiser 
la paix industrielle : ce qui a comme sous-produit de tendre à réduire les libertés 
des individus et des groupes. L'atteinte par ce pays d'une épargne approximativement 
égale à 10% du produit national brut exige le développement d'un système de valeur 
et d'institutions compatibles avec cette croissance économique. La satisfaction des 
besoins primaires de nourriture et de logement font apparaître des besoins supérieurs 
tels les libertés individuelles, la protection de la propriété et le respect de soi-même. 
L'insatisfaction de ces besoins entraîne une frustration chez les individus et les grou-
pes qui se traduit en différentes sortes de protestations politiques et en violence. 
Voici donc une des raisons de l'instabilité politique de nombreux pays en voie de 
développement. 
En plus de connaître différents régimes de démocratie politique et de capita-
lisme, le Canada, l'Australie et la Suède accordent une importance différente aux 
coûts économiques et sociaux reliés aux arrêts de travail dans chacun de ces pays. 
L'improvisation dans le domaine juridique et des preuves marquées d'imagination 
ont équipé ces pays d'assortiments différents de techniques de règlement de conflits. 
De façon similaire, le Pakistan, caractérisé par l'absence relative de valeur démocra-
tique, par un système de production contrôlé par l'État et par un grand nombre de 
grèves dites politiques, a édicté en 1959 une ordonnance sur les conflits du travail 
qui réduit ces conflits de façon drastique par des mesures strictes d'interventions gou-
vernementales définies dans l'ordonnance. Il devient alors évident qu'une corrélation 
hautement positive existe entre le système de valeur et les politiques d'intervention 
gouvernementale. Mais les valeurs ne changent pas aussi vite que le système écono-
mique. D'un autre côté, la croissance économique exige des changements dans les 
techniques de règlement de conflits. Un choix judicieux de ces techniques (encore 
plus important lorsqu'elles sont importées) contribuera grandement à réduire l'écart 
institutionnel au plus grand bénéfice de la société concernée. Nous croyons que la 
formule de la grève sans-arrêt-de-travail et la Commission des conflits d'intérêt public 
sont le genre d'innovation sociale que les pays en voie de développement tels que le 
Pakistan, peuvent expérimenter sans crainte. 
CONCLUSION 
Il semble que les systèmes de relations industrielles partout dans le monde de 
façon générale et en particulier dans les pays en voie de développement ont accusé 
un retard sur le développement des systèmes économiques de ces pays au cours de 
la période qui a suivi la seconde guerre mondiale. La diffusion du progrès technolo-
gique, l'aide étrangère et les investissements dans les pays en voie de développement 
rend de plus en plus nécessaire le besoin d'emprunter des idées en matière de légis-
lation. Si le changement dans les politiques d'interventions gouvernementales et dans 
les techniques de règlement des conflits est le résultat de l'emprunt techonologique, 
l'écart de temps avec les autres variables à l'intérieur du système serait énorme. Con-
séquemment, le système de relations industrielles sera perpétuellement en retard sur 
le système économique. 
